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Italy and the United Kingdom. They will also 
help watchdogs and others to scrutinize such 
technologies.
What do COVID-19 contact-tracing apps 
do? Running on a mobile phone, they inform 
people that they have spent time near some-
one with the virus. The contacts should then 
respond according to local rules, for example 
by isolating themselves. Prompt alerts are 
key because the incubation time of the virus 
is up to two weeks1–4. 
These digital interventions come at a price. 
Collecting sensitive personal data potentially 
threatens privacy, equality and fairness. Even 
if COVID-19 apps are temporary, rapidly rolling 
out tracing technologies runs the risk of creat-
ing permanent, vulnerable records of people’s 
health, movements and social interactions, 
over which they have little control.
More ethical oversight is essential. So far, 
such concerns have focused on rights to 
privacy (see go.nature.com/3e7jntx). Some 
governments have pledged to protect data 
privacy (see go.nature.com/3grwfe8). Apple 
and Google are developing a common inter-
face to support apps that do not require central 
data storage (see Nature http://doi.org/dwc6; 
Protect privacy, equality and 
fairness in digital contact 
tracing with these key 
questions.
Passengers on an underground train in Seoul. South Korea used contact tracing to great effect early in the pandemic. 
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Technologies to rapidly alert people when they have been in contact with someone carrying the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 are part of a strategy to bring the pandemic under control. 
Currently, at least 47 contact-tracing apps are 
available globally (see go.nature.com/2zc1qhk). 
They are already in use in Australia, South Korea 
and Singapore, for instance. And many other 
governments are testing or considering them. 
Here we set out 16 questions to assess whether 
— and to what extent — a contact-tracing app 
is ethically justifiable. These questions could 
assist governments, public-health agencies and 
providers to develop ethical apps — they have 
already informed developments in France, 
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2020). However, other ethical and social 
considerations must not be cast aside in the 
rush to quell the pandemic. 
For instance, contact-tracing apps should be 
available and accessible to anyone, irrespec-
tive of the technology needed or their level 
of digital literacy. Yet many apps work only 
with certain phones. Australia, for example, 
has no plans to make its app work with phones 
that use software older than Apple’s iOS 10 or 
Android 6.0. In the United Kingdom, around 
one-fifth of adults do not use a smartphone, 
and so might be excluded from a digital con-
tact-tracing programme. 
Rolling out an app without considering its 
wide ethical and social implications can be 
dangerous, costly and useless. For example, 
Bluetooth signals that show the proximity of 
two individuals’ mobile phones are not a cer-
tain indicator of infection risk — two people 
might be in the same space but physically sep-
arated, for example, by a wall. A high level of 
false positives from such an app (for instance, 
as a result of self-reporting) could lead to 
unjustified panic. And minimal protections 
against false negatives (people not using the 
app to report that they are unwell) could spur 
a false sense of safety in others and increase 
the risk of infection. 
The public might reject apps that breach 
principles of privacy, equality and fairness. 
This would frustrate the efforts and waste 
the resources being invested in developing 
and deploying such technology. Lack of 
consideration of ethics could erode trust in 
the government and public-health services 
— as happened last month, when the Norwe-
gian Data Protection Authority accused the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health of fail-
ing to carry out a proper risk assessment of its 
contact-tracing app, Smittestopp.
Many approaches
Temporarily restricting some fundamental 
rights and freedoms might be ethically jus-
tifiable in the context of hastening the end 
of the pandemic. Quarantining individuals, 
for example, helps to prevent the spread of 
the disease. Arguably, it might be unethical 
not to use digital tracing apps when neces-
sary. Nevertheless, much depends on the 
effectiveness of the app, the goal pursued, 
the type of system and the context in which 
it will be deployed.
Countries and regions are taking differ-
ent approaches. China’s Alipay Health Code 
app assigns a digital QR code to each user, 
which is colour-coded red, amber or green 
to indicate that person’s quarantine status 
and thus their ability to move around. People 
quarantined in Hong Kong must wear an 
electronic bracelet that shares their loca-
tion with local authorities through an app. 
Poland requires citizens to self-isolate for 
14 days after returning from overseas, and to 
Those responsible for contact-tracing apps 
should answer the following.
Principles: is this the right app to develop?
1. Is it necessary? 
• Yes, it must be developed to save lives (+). 
• No, there are better solutions (–).
2. Is it proportionate?
• Yes, the gravity of the situation justifies the 
potential negative impact (+).
• No, the potential negative impact is 
disproportionate to the situation (–). 
3. Is it sufficiently effective, timely, 
popular and accurate?
• Yes, evidence shows that it will work, is 
timely, will be adopted by enough people 
and yields accurate data and insights (+).
• No, it does not work well, is available too 
late or too early, will not be used widely, 
and is likely to collect data that have false 
positives and/or false negatives (–). 
4. Is it temporary? 
• Yes, there is an explicit and reasonable date 
on which it will cease (+). 
• No, it has no defined end date (–). 
Requirements: is this app being developed 
in the right way? 
5. Is it voluntary? 
• Yes, it is optional to download and install (+).
• No, it is mandatory and people can be 
penalized for non-compliance (–).
6. Does it require consent? 
• Yes, people have complete choice over 
what data are shared and when, and can 
change this at any time (+). 
• No, default settings are to share everything 
all the time, and this cannot be altered (–). 
7. Are the data kept private and users’ 
anonymity preserved?
• Yes, data are anonymous and held only 
on the user’s phone. Others who have been 
in contact are notified only that there is a 
risk of contagion, not from whom or where. 
Methods such as differential privacy are used 
to ensure this. Cyber-resilience is high (+).
• No, data are (re)identifiable owing to the 
level of data collected, and stored centrally. 
Locations of contacts are also available. 
Cyber-resilience is low (–). 
8. Can users erase the data? 
• Yes, they can do so at will; all data are 
deleted at the end point (+).
• No, there is no provision for data deletion, 
nor a guarantee that it can ever be deleted (–). 
9. Is the purpose of data collection defined?
• Yes, explicitly; for example, to alert users 
that they have encountered a potentially 
infected person (+).
• No, the purposes of data collection are not 
explicitly defined (–). 
10. Is the purpose limited?
• Yes, it is used for tracing and tracking of 
COVID-19 only (+).
• No, it can be regularly updated to add extra 
features that extend its functionality (–).
11. Is it used only for prevention?
• Yes, it is used only to enable people 
voluntarily to limit spread (+).
• No, it is also used as a passport to enable 
people to claim benefits or return to work (–).
12. Is it used for compliance?
• No, it is not used to enforce behaviour (+).
• Yes, non-compliance can result in 
punishment such as a fine or jail time (–).
13. Is it open-source?
• Yes, the code is publicly available for 
inspection, sharing and collaborative 
improvement (+).
• No, the source code is proprietary, and no 
information about it is provided (–).
14. Is it equally available?
• Yes, it is free and distributed to anyone (+).
• No, it is arbitrarily given only to some (–).
15. Is it equally accessible?
• Yes, it is user-friendly, even for naive users, 
and works on the widest possible range of 
mobile phones (+).
• No, it can be used only by those with 
specific devices and with sufficient digital 
education (–).
16. Is there a decommissioning process?
• Yes, there is a process for shutting it down (+).
• No, there are no policies in place (–).
Is this contact-tracing app  
ethically justifiable?











































send geotagged ‘selfies’ to the police to prove 
they are at home. Singapore’s TraceTogether 
app has been downloaded by about 25% of its 
population, much less than the 60% needed. 
This has led the country to introduce its 
SafeEntry system, which requires users to 
check in to public places using their national 
identity card or by scanning a QR code with 
their phone.
Apps differ in how they collect and 
store data. For example, they might rely 
on systems that are centralized, as in Aus-
tralia and Singapore, or decentralized, 
as in Germany and Italy (see also Nature 
http://doi.org/dwc6; 2020). Centralized apps 
send pseudonymized data collected by a 
user’s phone to a central database controlled 
by, for example, a national health agency, 
where contacts are matched. Decentralized 
approaches instead match contacts on the 
user’s device (see go.nature.com/3e7jntx). 
Use of an app can be voluntary, as the Euro-
pean Commission recommended in April 
(see go.nature.com/2x2hrat), or not. India’s 
app, for instance, is mandatory for citizens 
living in virus-containment zones and for all 
government and private-sector employees. 
Apps in Argentina and the United Kingdom 
ask users to self-report their symptoms, 
whereas the Norwegian app relies on the user 
having a formal diagnostic test.
More coordination is needed. Some supra-
national efforts to harmonize the apps are 
under way. The World Health Organization, 
for example, is developing a symptom-check-
ing app that might also enable contact tracing 
in under-resourced countries. The European 
Data Protection Supervisor has called for a 
Europe-wide contact-tracing app5. The Euro-
pean Commission has outlined requirements 
for digital tracing solutions deployed in the 
European Union, including compliance with 
EU data protection and privacy rules1. 
Countries and regions should consider a 
broader set of ethical concerns, including 
equality and fairness. Government agencies 
and developers working under pressure 
might find it hard to make these judgement 
calls quickly. In other contexts, such as bio-
ethics, ethical review boards typically have 
much more time to deliberate. Expert groups 
might be set up to advise, as France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom have done. (L.F. is 
a member of the UK National Health Service 
COVID-19 App Data Ethics Advisory Board; see 
go.nature.com/3cxyzrw).
Four principles
To be ethical, a contact-tracing app must 
abide by four principles: it must be neces-
sary, proportional, scientifically valid and 
time-bound. These principles are derived 
from the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United 
Nations Siracusa Principles, which specify 
the provisions in the ICCPR that limit how it 
can be applied. 
However, there are many ways in which an 
app can meet these principles. To address 
this gap, we have synthesized 16 questions 
that designers, deployers and evaluators 
should answer (see ‘Is this contact-tracing 
app ethically justifiable?’). For each, we give 
examples of how an app might be designed 
and used in a more (+) or less (–) ethically jus-
tifiable way. These questions apply to apps 
that have been released, as well as for those 
in development6. 
In theory, an ethical app should satisfy 
all 16 factors. The questions themselves 
might not be controversial, but the answers 
are likely to generate disagreement about 
whether and how much an app satisfies a 
factor, and which ethical factors should be 
a priority. 
In practice, there will be trade-offs. These 
will depend on the laws, values, attitudes 
and norms in different regions, as well as on 
changes over time in the spread and scale of 
the virus and the available technology. For 
example, it might be more ethically justifia-
ble to deploy an app that does not fully meet 
the stipulation that it should “work on the 
widest possible range of mobile phones” in a 
country with high smartphone penetration, 
such as South Korea — where more than 95% 
of people owned a smartphone in 2018. But it 
might be less justifiable in Japan, where 66% 
of the population did. 
Similarly, what was ethically justifiable in 
one place yesterday might not be so tomor-
row. For example, Germany shifted from a 
centralized to a decentralized app after some 
300 experts signed an open letter strongly 
criticizing the centralized approach. The 
same happened in Italy after Apple and 
Google announced their plan to support 
decentralized apps. Singapore could follow 
suit. Its centralized TraceTogether app was 
developed before the Apple–Google inter-
face was available, and developers are now 
aiming to make it compatible. 
An app’s implementation strategy and 
impact must also be considered. Something 
that looked good on paper can turn out to 
be ineffective in practice. This was the case 
with the Australian COVIDsafe app. Concerns 
about third-party access to user data and 
low compatibility with phones running old 
operating systems have led to a low level of 
adoption. More than a month since deploy-
ment, the minimum threshold of 40% has not 
been met. This is making the app irrelevant 
for managing the pandemic in Australia. 
If an app fails, it becomes unnecessary, 
and thus unethical. Apps that are no longer 
beneficial should be improved or decommis-
sioned. A review and exit strategy must be 
in place to establish when and how fast this 
should happen. These assessments should be 
conducted by an independent body, such as 
a regulator or an ethics advisory board, and 
not by the designers or the government itself. 
Circumstances and attitudes are changing 
quickly, so the questions in our framework 
must be asked anew at regular intervals.
One chance
Governments might not have a second chance 
to get an intervention right — failure now 
could breach public trust for the foresee-
able future. Governments, developers and 
deployers must ensure that COVID-19 con-
tact-tracing apps satisfactorily address the 
ethical questions we set out. Apps that do not 
should not be deployed; alternatives should 
be considered.
Simply rolling out a tracing app without 
ethical consideration is not acceptable. 
Even in a crisis, a ‘try-everything’ approach 
is dangerous when it ignores the real costs, 
including serious and long-lasting harms to 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and the 
opportunity costs of not devoting resources 
to something else.
The authors 
Jessica Morley is a graduate researcher at the 
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 
UK. Josh Cowls is a doctoral researcher at 
the Oxford Internet Institute, University of 
Oxford, UK, and at The Alan Turing Institute, 
London, UK. Mariarosaria Taddeo is a senior 
research fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, 
University of Oxford, UK, and a Turing Fellow/
DSTL Ethics Fellow at The Alan Turing Institute, 
London, UK. Luciano Floridi is professor of 
philosophy and ethics of information at the 
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 
UK, and a Turing Fellow and chair of the Data 
Ethics Group at The Alan Turing Institute, 
London, UK.
e-mail: pa.floridi@oii.ox.ac.uk
1. European Commission. Commission Recommendation 
(EU) 2020/518 of 8 April 2020 (EC, 2020); available at 
https://go.nature.com/2jkmmpt
2. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. 
Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic: 
Increased Transmission in the EU/EEA and the UK — Sixth 
Update (ECDC, 2020). 
3. Ferretti, L. et al. Science 368, eabb6936 (2020).
4. Keeling, M. J., Hollingsworth, T. D. & Read, J. M. Preprint 
at medRxiv https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.14.20023036 
(2020).
5. Wiewiórowski, W. EU Digital Solidarity: A Call for a Pan-
European Approach Against the Pandemic (European 
Data Protection Supervisor, 2020). 
6. Floridi, L. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 376, 20180081 (2018).
“Governments might not 
have a second chance to get 
an intervention right.”





























reserved.This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3830433
Pr
ep
rin
t 
t p
r r
ev
ie
we
d
